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Does Reciprocity Persist Over Time? 
Nickolas Gagnon* and Charles N. Noussair** 
 
Abstract 
We report the results from three distinct experiments, conducted in the Netherlands and in the United States, 
which extend the Gift-Exchange paradigm (Fehr et al., 1993; Fehr et al., 1997) for the study of worker-employer 
relationships. We focus on the effect of long time delays between the time at which workers learn their wage and 
when they choose their effort level, on the relationship between wage and effort. We compare effort choices 
made on the same day workers learn their wage, with those made several weeks afterward.  While the average 
effort chosen is the same under the two time lags, a positive and significant relationship between wage and effort 
appears consistently only in the short-run, while in the long-run, the relationship is weaker and less consistent. We 
also find that only workers who receive a wage equal to or below their self-reported fair wage exhibit significant 
reciprocal behavior, a pattern that we interpret as revealing negative rather than positive reciprocity in worker 
decisions. Using a new technology that tracks facial expressions called Noldus
TM
 FaceReader, we find that the 
emotion of anger is associated with reciprocal responses in the short-run, but this association is weaker in the 
long-run. 
Introduction 
Experimental research on the behavior of labor markets in which worker effort is not contractible, 
beginning with Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993), has yielded a number of important insights. Even in 
one-shot interactions, the average wages paid to workers considerably exceed the competitive market-
clearing level. In addition, worker effort tends to be greater than the minimum effort possible, despite 
the fact that exerting effort is costly to the worker. A robust relationship of greater effort reciprocating 
for higher wages is observed. These findings have spawned a large literature (e.g. Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and 
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Riedl, 1996; Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger, 1997; Fehr, Kirchler, Weichbold, Gächter, 1998; Fehr, 
Kirchsteiger, and Riedl, 1998;  Fehr and Falk, 1999; Gächter and Falk, 2002; Hannan, Kagel, and Moser, 
2002; Brandts and Charness, 2004; Brown, Falk, and Fehr, 2004; Charness, 2004). See Fehr, Goette, and 
Zehnder (2009), Charness and Kuhn (2011), Casoria and Riedl (2013), and Cooper and Kagel (2016) for 
surveys. 
Although worker-employer relationships may be short-term or long-term in nature, the laboratory 
studies cited above consider short-term behavior, in the sense that all wage and effort decisions are 
made within one laboratory session, which is typically under two hours in duration. A number of recent 
studies report field experiments focused on whether the reciprocal relationship between wage and 
effort is durable over longer time horizons. The results with regard to the persistence of the relationship 
have been mixed. On one hand, Gneezy and List (2006) find that reciprocity decreases in the span of a 
few hours after an increase in workers’ hourly wage. Bellemare and Shearer (2009) find reciprocity 
lasting one day after a one-off bonus payment. On the other hand, Kube, Maréchal, and Puppe (2012) 
observe higher effort for several hours after a one-time non-monetary gift. Gilchrist, Luca, and Malhotra 
(2016) observe a similar effect for the few hours following an unexpected wage increase. Cohn, Fehr, 
and Goette (2014) report higher productivity following an increase in hourly wage, for the entire time 
horizon of their study, which was several days. Hossain and List (2012) find an increase in productivity 
lasting for four weeks after a one-time monetary payment. Kube, Maréchal, and Puppe (2013) find no 
reciprocal response to a wage increase, but rather observe a sharp decrease in productivity, over a 
period of a few hours following a wage decrease. 
The mixed results obtained in these studies might be due to a number of factors, since the studies differ 
from each other in many aspects. Effort decisions are typically repeated, and thus some workers might 
exhibit a decline in effort because they feel like they have already reciprocated for any prior employer 
wage decisions. Worker behavior might differ depending on the context (List 2006, Hennig‐Schmidt, 
Sadrieh, and Rockenbach, 2010; Kube et al. 2012, 2013, Gilchrist et al. 2016), the perception of the 
fairness of the baseline wage (Fehr et al., 2009; Cohn et al., 2014), prior history (Bellemare and Shearer, 
2009), anticipated future interaction between worker and employer (Hossain and List, 2012), or on 
cultural factors (Lensberg and van der Heijden, 1998; Henrich, Bowles, Camerer, Fehr, Gintis, and 
McElreath, 2001; Charness, 2004; Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan, 2010; Hossain and List, 2012). 
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In the experiments reported here, we consider whether reciprocal behavior is long-term in nature, but 
we do so in a very simple one-shot design. We compare decisions of workers choosing their effort 
shortly after learning their wage, with those of workers making their choice a few weeks after receiving 
their wage information. There is exactly one decision made by each worker. This allows us to clearly 
identify and measure any and all reciprocal behavior the worker exhibits. The experiment is 
decontextualized to the extent that is typical in laboratory experiments. Interactions are anonymous so 
that prior or future interactions between participants are not relevant to their decisions. 
We conduct three separate experiments where we extend the laboratory Gift-Exchange paradigm for 
the study of employer-workers relationships to long time horizons. The experiments differ from each 
other in their parametric structure and some other details, but all allow scope for a reciprocal worker-
employer relationship to emerge. We consider whether workers choose effort levels to reciprocate 
employers' wage decisions when wages were set one month previously. In our experiments, subjects are 
divided into groups of three, one employer and two workers.1 The employer chooses one wage level 
that applies to both workers. The first worker then chooses an effort level after leaving the laboratory, 
but at most three hours afterward. The second worker submits the effort decision four weeks after the 
experimental session. At the time their decision is due, workers choosing four weeks later receive a 
reminder informing them of the wage they received and the payoff structure in effect. Two experiments 
were conducted in the Netherlands and one in the United States. We also test whether we observe both 
negative and positive reciprocity and whether one type of reciprocity dissipates more than the other 
with time. To do this, we ask workers what they consider a fair wage and we relate their effort to the 
difference between this fair wage and their actual wage. Wages lower (higher) than the fair level are 
assumed to lie in a negative (positive) domain for the worker, with the potential to trigger negative 
(positive) reciprocity. 
We structure our three experiments to allow application of the Partial Gift Exchange version of the 
Efficiency Wage hypothesis of Akerlof (1982) to the data. Our third experiment also allows a test of a key 
part of a later refinement, the Fair Wage-Effort hypothesis of Akerlof and Yellen (1988, 1990). The two 
models describe the worker-employer relationship in an environment in which effort is not contractible. 
In the first model, Akerlof (1982) assumes that higher wages offered by the employer are reciprocated 
                                                          
1
 Maximiano et al. (2007) show that the reciprocity found in Gift Exchange laboratory experiments is also observed 
in the case where multiple workers are matched with one employer. 
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with greater effort on the part of workers. The model predicts that employers take advantage of 
reciprocal effort and pay high wages, and workers reciprocate with extra effort. In the second model, 
Akerlof and Yellen (1990) assume that workers form an idea of what the fair wage is, and that they 
exhibit an asymmetric response to the wages around this fair wage. Wages below those that workers 
perceive as fair are punished with low effort, but those in excess of fair levels are not reciprocated in a 
positive manner. Employers therefore offer a fair wage to prevent shirking. They do not, however, offer 
a wage above the fair wage as it would not result in additional effort. Cohn et al. (2014) recently 
obtained support for this second model in a field experiment, finding that only the workers who felt that 
they were paid unfairly increased their productivity after a wage increase. Akerlof and Yellen (1990) 
highlight that emotions play a direct role in reciprocal behavior. They propose that anger is the 
psychological mechanism behind the asymmetric response to the wages around the fair wage. Wages 
below those considered as fair trigger a reaction of anger on the part of workers, who then respond with 
low effort. 
In our third experiment, conducted with American subjects, we study whether worker anger is in fact 
negatively associated with the wage offer received, as well as with the effort subsequently exerted. Such 
a relationship would be consistent with observations in other contexts, where anger is correlated with 
negative reciprocity in behavior (Bosman and van Winden, 2002; Offerman, 2002; Sanfey, Rilling, 
Aronson, Nystrom, and Cohen 2003; Xiao and Houser, 2005; Reuben and van Winden, 2008; Hopfensitz 
and Reuben, 2009; van Leeuwen, Noussair, Offerman, Suetens, van Veelen, and van de Ven, 2016). To 
measure and track anger in real time, we use Facereading technology to monitor the facial expressions 
of participants. 
We obtain five principal results in this study. First, in each of our three experiments, effort is not 
significantly different between workers choosing an effort several hours or several weeks after learning 
their wage. Second, there is a significantly positive effect of wage on effort in the short-term (hours) for 
all experiments, but a significant positive effect in the long-term (weeks) in only one of the three 
experiments. Third, only negative reciprocity is significant, corroborating a key assumption of the Fair 
Wage-Effort hypothesis. Fourth, the wage predictions of employers are consistent with anticipation of 
the short-term reciprocal wage-effort relationship when making their wage decisions. Fifth, the change 
in a worker’s anger at the moment he learns his wage correlates with subsequent effort decisions taken 
within hours, but not those taken weeks later. Indeed, those workers who know that they will receive 
  
 
5 
 
 
their wage and make their effort decisions a month later, get less angry when offered a low wage. The 
negative correlations between anger and subsequent effort decisions, as well as between anger and the 
wage received, are stronger for workers who receive wages below or equal to the wage they view as 
fair. These relationships hold for both types of worker, but the correlations are lower for delayed 
workers  
Our results lead to four conclusions that relate to prior field experiments on Gift Exchange. First, 
reciprocity in worker-employer interaction seems to decrease over time, even in the laboratory, though 
over three hours at least, the reciprocal relationship remains strong. Second, small changes in details of 
the experimental design or cultural differences might affect behavior substantially. Third, we are in 
agreement with Cohn et al. (2014), who find that workers who feel that they are paid more than the 
wage they view as fair do not respond to a higher wage with more effort. Fourth, we provide the first 
evidence that anger in response to learning one’s wage correlates with subsequent effort, though much 
more in the short-term, indicating that anger is a relevant variable for understanding reciprocal 
behavior. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the experimental design, section 3 
presents the hypotheses, section 4 reports the results, and section 5 offers the conclusion. 
2. Experimental Design 
In this section we describe the structure of each of the three experiments, called Tilburg-L (Tilburg Low 
Efficiency), Tilburg-H (Tilburg High Efficiency), and Tucson-H (Tilburg High Efficiency). Section 2.1 lists the 
procedures that were identical in the three experiments. Section 2.2 then describes the aspects that 
differed among the three. It explains how the last experiment conducted, Tucson-H, allows testing of 
some additional hypotheses beyond those evaluated in the first two experiments. .  
2.1. Procedures Common to all Experiments 
Participants are assigned randomly to one of three roles: 1) Employer, 2) Immediate worker, or 3) 
Delayed worker. One third of participants are assigned to each role. The roles are private information. 
Groups are formed, each consisting of one employer and two workers. We describe the two workers as 
immediate or delayed, based on when they make their effort decision. The participants are informed 
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that the groups are randomly constituted and anonymous, in the sense that participants never learn 
who else was in their group. It is emphasized to them that they would only play the game exactly once.  
The game has two stages. In the first stage, the employer, endowed with wealth a, decides on a wage w 
to pay to his/her two workers. The wage must be equal for the two workers. The wage is costly to the 
employer and benefits the workers. In the second stage, each worker, with initial endowment d, 
observes his wage and chooses an effort level e. The worker’s effort is costly to himself, with marginal 
cost c, and benefits the employer by the productivity parameter b.  
The immediate worker must submit an effort level, eI within three hours after the end of the laboratory 
session. The delayed worker chooses an effort level eD within a five-day interval beginning four weeks 
after the session.2 The workers, therefore, do not choose their effort in the laboratory. They send their 
choice to an email address provided to them, from a location of their choosing. Participants are 
informed during the session that the delayed workers would receive an email reminder, containing the 
wage they have been awarded and a copy of the instructions.3 4 Participants are also informed that if a 
worker does not send an email with her effort choice, she would not be paid anything beyond the show-
up fee and the employer would be paid back the wage offered to that worker.5 
The earnings of workers are sent to them on the day after the receipt of their effort choice. The earnings 
of the employer are sent on the day after the receipt of the effort choice of the delayed worker she is 
matched with. 
                                                          
2
 The time intervals in experiment Tilburg-L are slightly different than in the other two experiments. Immediate 
workers were instructed to send their effort choice within two hours after the session, and delayed workers within 
a period of 24 hours, occurring one month after the session. This was not enough time for both types of workers, 
usually because some students check their university mailbox infrequently and therefore missed the reminder 
during the 24-hour window one month after the session. We accepted effort choices from a few immediate 
workers after the two-hour deadline. We also informed delayed workers by email that they would have additional 
days to choose their effort and accepted choices up to eight days after the original deadline. 
3
 The instructions for Tucson-H, which are similar to those for Tilburg-L and Tilburg-H, are in Appendix B. 
4
 The email reminders for each experiment are in Appendix C. 
5
 Paying back the wage to employers when workers do not choose an effort does not change the fact that the least 
costly action of workers is choosing an effort of zero, and the action of workers that earns the employer the most 
is choosing maximum effort. 
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The payoffs to the three types of participants were given by:6 
Employer:   𝑎 − 2 ∗ 𝑤 + 𝑏 ∗ (𝑒𝐼 + 𝑒𝐷) 
Immediate worker:  𝑑 + 𝑤 − 𝑐 ∗ 𝑒𝐼 
Delayed worker:  𝑑 + 𝑤 −  𝑐 ∗ 𝑒𝐷 
eI, and eD denote the effort levels chosen by the immediate and delayed workers, respectively. The 
ranges of possible wages, effort levels, effort costs and output differed among the three experiments. 
The values are given in Table 1.  
Table 1 - Summary of Parameters  
Parameters & Range of 
Variables  
Tilburg-L Tilburg-H Tucson-H 
a 12 EUR 8 EUR 11 USD 
b 2.5 2.5 2.5 
c 1 0.25 0.25 
d 4 EUR 5 EUR 4 USD 
e [0,w] [0, 2.4] [0.4] 
w [0 EUR, 4 EUR] [0 EUR, 2 EUR] [0 USD, 4 USD] 
Show-up Fee 0 EUR 0 EUR 8 USD 
Average Earnings/Employer 10 EUR 8 EUR 22 USD 
Average Earnings/Imm. Worker 6 EUR 6 EUR 14 USD 
Average Earnings/Del. Worker 6 EUR 6 EUR 14 USD 
Average Duration of Session   40 Min. 40 Min. 40 Min. 
Payment Method Bank Transfer
7
 Bank Transfer Cash and Mail 
Time Period Conducted March-May 2015 April-June, November-
December 2015 
January-March 2016 
Location CentER Lab (Tilburg, 
The Netherlands) 
CentER Lab (Tilburg, 
The Netherlands) 
Economic Science Lab 
(Tucson, United States) 
Number of Participants 138 99 194
8
 
Attrition/ Imm. Workers
9
 0% 3% 7.7% 
Attrition/ Del. Workers 9% 9% 12.5% 
Net Number of Participants 134 95 181 
                                                          
6
 The payoff structure was presented to subjects in terms of these formulas, with the actual values in effect, rather 
than the variables a, b, c, d, indicated. See Charness et al. (2004) for a discussion of the effects of different formats 
of presentation. 
7
 Bank transfers are the most common way of payment in the Netherlands, even for small payments. 
8 One subject participated twice. We removed the observation from the second participation. 
9
 Attrition is not correlated with low wage offers. In Tucson-H, the mean wages of immediate and delayed workers 
who did not respond were 2.30 USD and 2.60 USD, close to the overall sample mean of 2.62 USD. In Tilburg-L, the 
four delayed workers who did not respond had a mean wage of 1.58 EUR, slightly below the sample average of 
2.07 EUR. In Tilburg-H, one immediate worker with a wage of 0.70 EUR did not respond, and three delayed 
workers with a mean wage of 0.90 EUR did not respond. This is, again, close to the mean sample wage of 1.22 EUR. 
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Wages and effort can be chosen in increments of 10 cents and 0.1 units, respectively. Note that the ratio 
b/c, denoting the benefit of effort to the employer over the cost of effort to the worker, is constant 
within each experiment (Gift Exchange experiments often feature a diminishing ratio b/c). We used a 
constant ratio for simplicity, which is especially desirable since participants only play the game once.  
Sessions had between 6 and 15 participants. Demographic statistics for the participants are presented in 
Table 2.  
Table 2 – Demographic Profile of Participants 
Demographics Tilburg-L  Tilburg-H  Tucson-H 
    
Age 22.9 23.3 20.8 
Male 50% 53% 52% 
    
At least 1 Friend in Session 38% 29% 13% 
At least 2 Friends in Session 17% 2% 4% 
At least 3 Friends in Session
10
 6% 0% 1% 
    
Business/Economics Major 64% 67% 71% 
Science Major 2% 1% 20% 
Social Science Major 31% 32% 8% 
Other Majors 4% 1% 5% 
    
American . . 78% 
Asian 28% 15% 19% 
European 64% 72% . 
Other  9% 15% 3% 
    
Majors and countries/continents do not sum up to one because of double majors 
and dual nationals. 
A session proceeds in the following manner. Participants arrive at the laboratory and are seated 
individually at a computer. They are given a written copy of the instructions, which the experimenter 
reads aloud. Participants are forbidden from communicating with others. Before making their choices, 
they must complete two practice exercises to confirm their understanding. They are encouraged to ask 
                                                          
10
 In Tilburg-L, four participants claimed to have four friends in a session. In Tucson-H, a participant claimed to have 
many friends in a session in which all other participants stated they had none. 
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questions and their individual answers are verified by the experimenter. Help is provided if needed, as 
each participant is required to fill in the correct answers to proceed further.11  
2.2. Procedures Specific to Each Experiment 
2.2.1 The Tilburg-L and Tilburg-H Experiments 
The procedures for the Tilburg-L experiment are described fully in section 2.1. The Tilburg-H experiment 
differs from Tilburg-L in several respects. As in standard Gift Exchange experiments, the effort choice of 
workers is not limited by the wage offered. The parameters in effect in Tilburg-H also ensure greater 
productivity of effort, by both reducing the cost and increasing the output of effort. This is captured in 
the ratio b/c. A relatively high ratio tends to reduce the censoring of the effort data at the lower bound 
(Kessler, 2013). 
There are two other important differences between Tilburg-L and Tilburg-H. In Tilburg-H, employers are 
asked to make predictions about the choices of both the immediate and the delayed workers that they 
are matched with. One of the two predictions is selected to count toward their payment. They earn 1 
EUR if the prediction selected to count is within 0.2 units of the actual effort chosen. At the same time 
that he chooses a wage, the employer also requests a non-binding effort level from each worker. The 
effort level requested is constrained to be the same for the two workers. The effort request is included 
in the reminder to delayed workers to ensure that they can recall it. 
2.2.2 The Tucson-H Experiment 
This experiment differs from Tilburg-H in several respects. There are a number of differences in the 
parameters between the two experiments, as indicated in Table 1. In Tuscon-H, participants receive a 
show-up fee of 8 USD at the time of the session on top of their earnings from the game. However, the 
key ratio b/c remains the same as in Tilburg-H, at a level of 10. Employers also predict the effort levels of 
the two workers that they are grouped with, but they receive 1 USD if their selected prediction of 
worker effort is within 0.4 of the actual effort. Furthermore, in Tucson-H, employers request a non-
binding effort level from each worker at the time that they announce the wage they are paying. This 
request is constrained to be the same for each worker. In addition, all workers are asked to state what 
                                                          
11
 The game was programmed using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007).  
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they think would be a fair wage. They do so before learning their actual wage. It is emphasized to them 
that this fair wage would not be revealed to any other participant and therefore could not affect the 
actual wage they receive.  
We videotape participants for the entire session, with their consent. The videotapes are then analyzed 
with Noldus FaceReader software, which tracks facial expressions and analyzes the emotions they 
express. The software tracks facial movements using the Facial Action Coding System, which associates 
specific muscle movements to the six basic universal emotions catalogued by Paul Ekman and his 
colleagues (e.g. Ekman and Friesen, 1977; Ekman et al., 1987; and Ekman and Friesen, 2003). The 
emotions are happiness, fear, anger, disgust, surprise, and sadness. FaceReader also measures how 
closely a facial expression conforms to a neutral state and generates an overall measure of emotional 
valence. FaceReader has been employed in a number of experimental economic studies focusing on 
emotions (e.g. Nguyen and Noussair, 2014; Breaban and Noussair, 2014; Habětínová and Noussair, 
2015; Van Leeuwen et al., 2016), but has also been used in marketing (Teixeira et al., 2012; Lewinski et 
al., 2014) and psychology studies (Chentsova-Dutton and Tsai, 2010; Gadea, Aliño, Espert, and Salvador, 
2015). 
In the Tucson-H experiment, participants are paid in cash. The participation fee is paid at the end of the 
session. Earnings from the Gift Exchange game are sent by mail in cash using an envelope that 
participants are given at the beginning of the session, on which they write their name and mailing 
address. 
3. Hypotheses 
The first two hypotheses apply to each of the three experiments, and concern the effect of a long time 
delay on effort choices. They originate from the mixed results of prior experimental work, and compare 
the behavior of immediate and delayed workers. Hypotheses 3 and 4 apply exclusively to Tucson-H. 
They emerged after the first two experiments and guided the design of Tucson-H. They posit 
asymmetries in worker behavior between cases in which the wage is perceived as fair and as unfair. 
Hypothesis 3 is an assumption in the model of Akerlof and Yellen (1988, 1990) that has also been 
evaluated by Cohn et al. (2014). The assumption is that a reciprocal wage-effort relationship only holds 
for wages below a level considered fair. Hypothesis 4 asserts that this asymmetry in behavior above vs. 
below the fair wage holds independently of the time delay.  
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We first consider the relationship between effort and time delay, for a given wage. It is not clear from 
the literature whether we should expect immediate and delayed workers to choose a different effort 
level and in which direction they might differ. The most closely related studies are Kovarik (2009) and 
Dreber et al. (2016), who investigate the interaction between altruism and long time lags. They find that 
when dictators have to split money that is payable in the future, they keep more for themselves. This is, 
however, different from the choice workers face here, which is governed in part by altruism, but also by 
reciprocity and perhaps other considerations. Furthermore, in our experiment, workers are reacting to a 
past decision by another agent rather than making a decision affecting the future. In the absence of 
prior research on closely related questions, we propose the following null hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1 H0
1: For a given wage, immediate workers exert the same effort as delayed workers. (eI = 
eD) 
While hypothesis 1 concerns the level of effort, hypothesis 2 considers whether a positive relationship 
between wage and effort appears with similar force in the short and long term. The Gift Exchange 
version of the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis (Akerlof, 1982) does not consider a potential interaction of 
reciprocity and time. As discussed in the introduction, field experiments on whether reciprocity is 
sustained over time have found diverse results. Similar mixed results are found in laboratory studies of 
the effect of short time delays on reciprocity. Grimm and Mengel (2011) find that a 10-minute delay 
reduces rejections in ultimatum games. Neo et al. (2013) observe a reduction of rejections in ultimatum 
games with a similar delay and no effect on reciprocal behavior in the investment game. Thus, our 
second hypothesis is as follows.  
Hypothesis 2 H0
2: Immediate and delayed workers respond with the same change in effort to a change in 
their wage (deI/dw = deD/dw). 
Hypothesis 3 is a test of the Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis (Akerlof and Yellen 1988, 1990). The hypothesis 
relies on the assumption that workers respond to a higher wage with higher effort only up to the point 
where the wage is considered fair. Workers do not reciprocate for an increase in wage above the fair 
wage with greater effort. Cohn et al. (2014) are, to our knowledge, the only authors who have tested 
whether there is an asymmetric response at the wage viewed as fair, as assumed in the Fair Wage-Effort 
Hypothesis. In Tucson-H, as explained in Section 2, we asked workers for a self-reported fair wage 
before they received their actual wage. Because there is only one previous study on the topic, and the 
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study differs in important aspects from ours, we maintain as our initial hypothesis that the relationship 
between wage and effort is the same for workers whose wage is below vs. above their belief about what 
constitutes a fair wage. 
Hypothesis 3 H0
3: Immediate workers receiving a wage below their self-reported fair wage respond with 
the same change in effort to a change in their wage as those receiving a wage above their fair level 
(deI/dwL, = deI/dwH, for all wL and wH where wH > wF > wL, and wF is the fair wage).  
Hypothesis 4 concerns whether any asymmetry in reciprocity below vs. above the fair wage continues to 
exist if there is a delay in effort choices. It is possible that negative reciprocity dissipates over time 
whereas positive reciprocity does not. This could be the case if, for example, negative reciprocity is 
caused by a strong negative emotion such as anger that would dissipate over time. Indeed, Akerlof and 
Yellen (1990) present anger as the driver for the negative response of workers to getting less than what 
they view as a fair wage. The FaceReader data allow us to measure overall emotional valence and anger, 
and study their relationship to negatively reciprocal decisions. In the absence of any prior evidence to 
the contrary, our null hypothesis is that any asymmetry in reciprocity based on whether workers receive 
a wage below or above their fair wage is unaffected by a delay. 
Hypothesis 4 H0
4: Immediate workers and delayed workers respond with the same relationship between 
their effort and their wage when (a) the wage they receive exceeds their reported fair wage, and when 
(b) the wage they receive is less than their reported fair wage (deI/dw = deD/dw, for w > wF, and deI/dw = 
deD/dw, for w < wF). 
4. Results 
This section is organized in three parts. The first part presents an overview of the data. The second 
reports the tests of our hypotheses, and the third is an analysis of other patterns in our data, including 
the relationship between emotions and effort decisions. Our first four results, presented in section 4.2, 
appear in the same order as the hypotheses they evaluate. Results 5 and 6, reported in section 4.3, 
concern the connection between anger and low effort, as well as an analysis of employers’ predictions.   
4.1. Summary of the Data 
In Table 3, we summarize the average values of participants’ decision variables. We show scatter plots of 
immediate and delayed efforts for each experiment in Figure 1. 
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Table 3 – Summary of Participants’ Decisions 
Experiment Tilburg-L Tilburg-H Tucson-H 
    
Wage 2.067  (1.288) 1.218  (0.683) 2.617  (1.014) 
    
Effort of Immediate Worker 0.343  (0.595) 0.538  (0.727) 1.395  (1.217) 
Effort of Delayed Worker 0.343  (0.596) 0.61    (0.833) 1.704  (1.397)  
    
Fair Wage Indicated by Imm. Worker   3.134  (0.801)  
Fair Wage Indicated by Del. Worker   3.413  (0.716) 
    
Predicted Effort of Imm. Worker  1.142  (0.684) 2.163  (0.919) 
Predicted Effort of Del. Worker  1.137  (0.703) 1.958  (1.258) 
    
The numbers presented are averages. In Tucson-H, both wage and effort range from 0 to 4. In Tilburg-H, 
wage ranges from 0 to 2 and effort from 0 to 2.4. In Tilburg-L, wage ranges from 0 to 4 and effort from 0 to 
2. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
The table reveals that the following patterns are common to all three experiments. The average effort of 
immediate and delayed workers is similar, and is well in excess of the minimum of zero. The average 
wage is close to the midpoint of the range of possible wage levels. The wage workers view as fair is 
roughly three times as far from the minimum as the maximum possible wage. The fair wage exceeds the 
actual average wage. The fair wage is similar for immediate and delayed workers. Employers’ 
predictions about workers’ effort are more optimistic than the actual observed effort, and are similar for 
the immediate and the delayed workers. 
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the wages workers receive and the effort they choose. The 
two panels in the upper left of the figure contain the data from the Tilburg-L experiment, while the 
upper right and lower panels show the data from Tilburg-H and Tucson-H, respectively. The wage-effort 
relationships are graphed separately for immediate and delayed workers. 
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The figure reveals that for immediate workers, there is a strong tendency to reciprocate a higher wage 
with higher effort. This increasing relationship between wage and effort appears in each of the three 
experiments. In Tilburg-H and Tucson-H, in which the cost of effort is relatively low, the relationship 
seems to be weaker for delayed workers, with low wages (that is, in the lowest ¼ of the possible range 
of wages) leading to higher effort compared to the immediate workers. Delayed workers have a stronger 
tendency to choose effort close to the maximum possible level. In Tilburg-L, workers receiving a wage of 
zero are forced to select an effort of zero because the effort choice cannot exceed the wage. 
Nonetheless, in Tilburg-L, in which the cost of effort is high, there are also more instances of zero effort 
for workers who receive a wage above zero than in the other experiments. Thus, our three experiments 
replicate the two main findings of the gift-exchange literature. (1) Both wages and effort are 
Figure 1 – Scatter Plots of Immediate and Delayed Efforts for Each Experiment 
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considerably higher than (0, 0) the subgame perfect equilibrium levels under the assumption of pure 
self-interest. (2) For immediate workers, higher wages are correlated with higher effort. 
4.2 Evaluation of Hypotheses  
The first two hypotheses concern differences in effort between immediate and delayed workers. To test 
these two hypotheses, we estimate the following Tobit specification.12 The Tobit model is chosen to 
account for the censoring of the effort variable: 13 
𝒆𝒋 =  𝜶 +  𝜸 ∗ 𝑫𝒋 + 𝜷𝒊𝒎𝒎 ∗ 𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒋 ∗ (𝟏 − 𝑫𝒋) + 𝜷𝒅𝒆𝒍 ∗ 𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒋 ∗ 𝑫𝒋 +  𝜺𝒋             (𝐼) 
In this equation, ej denotes the effort of worker j, wagej denotes the wage, and Dj equals 0 for 
immediate workers and 1 for delayed workers. We also include a set of demographic controls consisting 
of the worker’s age, gender, nationality and whether one has at least one friend in the session (friend). 
The estimates are presented in Table 4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 We use robust standard errors in all regressions. 
13
 In Tilburg-L, we assume that only effort choices of 0 and 2 are censored above in the Tobit regression, even 
though all effort levels are subject to censoring if they equal the wage. 
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Table 4 – Estimates of Effect on Effort from Tobit Regression (I) 
 
Experiment 
(1)  
Tilburg-L 
(2) (3)  
Tilburg-H 
(4) (5)  
Tucson-H 
(6) 
Wage/Imm. Workers, 
 𝛽𝑖𝑚𝑚  
0.484
*** 
(0.158) 
0.375
***
   
(0.141)  
0.729
*** 
(0.239)  
0.750
**
 
(0.296)  
0.918
**** 
(0.233) 
0.933
**** 
(0.205) 
       
Wage/Del. Workers,  
𝛽𝑑𝑒𝑙  
0.268 
(0.182) 
0.262  
(0.173) 
-0.396 
(0.439) 
-0.368 
(0.441) 
0.606
** 
(0.271) 
0.626
**
 
(0.263) 
       
Delay,  𝜸 0.536 
(0.050) 
0.144    
(0.466) 
1.453
** 
(0.702) 
1.412
** 
(0.689)  
1.240 
(0.916) 
1.308 
(0.859) 
       
Constant -1.239
*** 
(0.399) 
-5.807
****
 
(1.562) 
-0.598
*
 
(0.319) 
-2.032 
(1.405) 
-1.213
** 
(0.596) 
1.433 
(1.540) 
       
Age  0.215
**** 
(0.059)  
 0.075 
(0.048)  
 -0.125
* 
(0.069) 
       
Man  -0.055   
(0.259) 
 -0.150 
(0.313)  
 0.497 
(0.330) 
       
Friend  -0.068 
(0.272)  
 0.054 
(0.395) 
 1.305
*** 
(0.411) 
       
American 
 
     -0.656
*
 
(0.351) 
       
European  0.002 
(0.256)  
  -0.351 
(0.389)  
  
       
Pseudo-R
2
 0.060 0.180 0.047 0.080 0.055 0.086 
N 88 88 62 62 116 116 
       
N denotes the sample size containing both types of workers. Workers are split almost even per type. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. P-values: *0.10, **0.05, ***0.01, ****0.001. 
To test our first hypothesis, that the time delay has no effect on effort for a given wage, we use an F-test 
for the joint restrictions that 𝛾 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽𝑖𝑚𝑚 = 𝛽𝑑𝑒𝑙 for each experiment. The F-test fails to reject the 
hypothesis for each of the three experiments. For Tucson-H and Tilburg-L, the p-values are 0.208 and 
0.564 without controls and 0.127 and 0.835 with demographic controls, respectively. The restriction is 
close to significant at conventional levels for Tilburg-H without demographics (p-value is 0.0921 without 
demographics and 0.111 with demographics). This yields our first result: 
Result 1: For a given wage, immediate and delayed workers choose the same level of effort. 
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To test our second hypothesis that the effort-wage relationship does not change with delay, we used an 
F-test of the restriction  𝛽𝑖𝑚𝑚 = 𝛽𝑑𝑒𝑙 for each experiment. The restriction is insignificant for Tilburg-H, 
but not for Tilburg-L or Tucson-H (p-values are 0.030, 0.343, and 0.382 without demographics and 0.039, 
0.588, and 0.358 with demographics, respectively). We also test whether a reciprocal relationship is 
present at all with t-tests of 𝛽𝑖𝑚𝑚 = 0 and  𝛽𝑑𝑒𝑙 = 0 separately for each experiment. The t-test soundly 
rejects that  𝛽𝑖𝑚𝑚 = 0 for each of the three experiments (p-values are 0.003, 0.003, and 0.000 without 
demographics, and 0.009, 0.014, and 0.000 with demographics, respectively). The t-test similarly rejects 
that  𝛽𝑑𝑒𝑙 = 0 for Tucson-H (p-value is 0.027 without demographics, and 0.019 with demographics), but 
fails to reject that  𝛽𝑑𝑒𝑙 = 0  for Tilburg-L and Tilburg-H (p-values are 0.145 and 0.371 without 
demographics, and 0.133 and 0.408 with demographics, respectively, and the coefficient for Tilburg-H is 
negative). Note, however, that, even in Tucson-H, the coefficient of wage for delayed workers is only 
two-thirds of the coefficient for immediate workers. When estimating a Tobit regression on the Tucson-
H data for immediate and delayed workers separately, we also observe that the pseudo-R2 is much 
larger for immediate than for delayed workers (0.096 and 0.026 without demographics, and 0.182, and 
0.041 with demographics, respectively).14 15 
The above analysis provides the basis for our second result: 
Result 2: Higher wages are reciprocated with greater effort. The relationship is weaker and less 
consistent with a one-month time delay. 
Our two remaining hypotheses apply only to Tucson-H. The third hypothesis is that immediate workers 
would exhibit the same effort-wage relationship for wages below and above their self-reported fair 
wage. To test this, we estimate the following Tobit regression:  
 𝒆𝒋 =  𝜶 + 𝜷𝒊𝒎𝒎−𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒗𝒆 ∗ (𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒋 − 𝒇𝒂𝒊𝒓𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒋) ∗ 𝒛𝒋 + 𝜷𝒊𝒎𝒎−𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘(𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒋 − 𝒇𝒂𝒊𝒓𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒋) ∗
(𝟏 − 𝒛𝒋) + 𝝀 ∗ 𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒋 + 𝜺𝒋                                                                                                             (𝐼𝐼) 
Here, (wagej – fairwagej) denotes the difference between a worker’s actual wage and her self-reported 
fair wage. The dummy variable zj takes value 1 if the wage is equal to or above the fair wage and 0 if the 
                                                          
14
 A similarly pattern of greater explanatory power of wage on the effort provision for immediate than for delayed 
workers is observed in Tilburg-L and Tilburg-H. In Tucson-H, although qualitatively similar, the difference between 
the wage coefficients is also smaller when we use two separate regressions. 
15
 Our results for Tucson-H are robust to excluding participants who have a friend in a session. 
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wage is below the fair level submitted by worker j. The estimates are presented in columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 5. 
Table 5 – Estimates of the Effect of Wage Fairness on Effort from Tobit regressions (II) and (III) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Immediate Workers     
     
Wage 1.033
***
 
(0.352) 
1.100
****
 
(0.275) 
1.130
***
 
(0.386) 
1.212
****
 
(0.320) 
     
Gap Below Fair (𝜷𝒊𝒎𝒎−𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘) 0.042 
(0.319) 
-0.068 
(0.264) 
0.052 
(0.353) 
-0.078 
(0.296) 
     
Gap Above Fair (𝜷𝒊𝒎𝒎−𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒗𝒆) -0.552
*
 
(0.278) 
-0.511
*
 
(0.276) 
-0.619
**
 
(0.305) 
-0.553
*
 
(0.298) 
     
Delayed Workers     
     
Wage  
 
 
 
0.703 
(0.692) 
0.767 
(0.656) 
     
Gap Below Fair (𝜷𝒅𝒆𝒍−𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘)  
 
 
 
-0.077 
(0.677) 
-0.030 
(0.630) 
     
Gap Above Fair (𝜷𝒅𝒆𝒍−𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒗𝒆)  
 
 
 
-0.222 
(0.919) 
-0.875 
(0.878) 
     
Delay   
 
 
 
1.280 
(2.751) 
1.667 
(2.493) 
     
Constant -1.274 
(1.070) 
1.862 
(2.131) 
-1.551 
(1.182) 
0.808 
(1.757) 
     
Demographics No Yes No Yes 
     
Pseudo-R
2
 0.117 0.206 0.063 0.097 
N 60 60 116 116 
     
Standard errors are in parentheses. P-values: *0.10, **0.05, ***0.01, ****0.001. 
The negative sign of  𝛽𝑖𝑚𝑚_𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 indicates that for immediate workers the effort-wage relationship is 
less steep for wages above than below the fair level. To test for equality of the wage-effort relationship 
above vs. below the fair wage, we use an F-test of the restriction that  𝛽𝑖𝑚𝑚−𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 = 𝛽𝑖𝑚𝑚−𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤. The 
F-test does not reject that the two coefficients are equal (the p-value is 0.0154 without demographics, 
and 0.239 with demographics). A less stringent test is to examine whether effort-wage reciprocity is 
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significantly different from 0, below and above the fair wage separately. To do this, we conduct separate 
F-tests of the restrictions that  𝛽𝑖𝑚𝑚−𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 +  𝜆 = 0 and 𝛽𝑖𝑚𝑚−𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 +  𝜆 = 0. The F-test does not 
reject that there is no reciprocity when the wage is above the fair wage, although with demographics 
the p-value is close to significance at conventional levels (p-value is 0.168 without demographics, and 
0.063 including demographics). The F-test rejects that there is no reciprocity when the wage is below 
the fair wage (p-value is always 0.0001 or below). Thus, we find that a reciprocal relationship exists 
when wages are below or equal to fair levels, but not when they are above.  
How important is individual heterogeneity in perceptions of the fair wage for the asymmetry in effort 
decisions in response to relatively low vs. high wages? We consider this by estimating equation (II) and 
restricting the fair wage for all workers to be at the midpoint of the wage range, 2 USD. Reciprocity for 
wages below 2 USD is positive and significant (p-value below 0.01), while reciprocity for wages above 2 
USD is positive and close to significant without demographic controls (p-value 0.059), but positive and 
significant with the controls (0.018). The coefficient of reciprocity below 2 USD is around four times as 
large. While this difference between coefficients is qualitatively similar to the results obtained when 
taking into account individuals’ indicated fair wages, we are more likely to find significant reciprocity 
above the fair wage with this technique than when using self-reported fair wage. This indicates that 
taking the heterogeneity of views about fairness into account isolates the asymmetry in reciprocal 
behavior more clearly.  The gain of our method in terms of explanatory power, however, is modest 
(Pseudo-R2 is 0.117 vs. 0.113 without demographics and 0.206 vs. 0.195 with demographics). We also 
note that a kink similar to the one in Tucson-H is observed by taking the middle point of the range as the 
fair wage in Tilburg-L, but not in Tilburg-H. 
Our fourth hypothesis stated that the asymmetry between negative and positive reciprocity would be 
the same for immediate and delayed workers. To consider whether this is the case, we use the following 
Tobit regression, which is similar to regression number (II), but allows for different coefficients for the 
two types of workers: 
 𝒆𝒋 =  𝜶 + 𝜸 ∗ 𝑫𝒋 + 𝜷𝒊𝒎𝒎−𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒗𝒆 ∗ (𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒋 − 𝒇𝒂𝒊𝒓𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒋) ∗ 𝒛𝒋 ∗ (𝟏 − 𝑫𝒋) + 𝜷𝒊𝒎𝒎−𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘 ∗
(𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒋 − 𝒇𝒂𝒊𝒓𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒋) ∗ (𝟏 − 𝒛𝒋) ∗ (𝟏 − 𝑫𝒋) + 𝝀𝒊𝒎𝒎 ∗ 𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒋 ∗ (𝟏 − 𝑫𝒋) + 𝜷𝒅𝒆𝒍−𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒗𝒆 ∗
(𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒋 − 𝒇𝒂𝒊𝒓𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒋) ∗ 𝒛𝒋 ∗ 𝑫𝒋 +  𝜷𝒅𝒆𝒍−𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘 ∗ (𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒋 − 𝒇𝒂𝒊𝒓𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒋) ∗ (𝟏 − 𝒛𝒋) ∗ 𝑫𝒋 + 𝝀𝒅𝒆𝒍 ∗
𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒋 ∗ 𝑫𝒋 + 𝜺𝒋                                                                                                                                          (𝐼𝐼𝐼) 
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The estimates are presented in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5. Both  𝛽𝑖𝑚𝑚_𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 and  𝛽𝑑𝑒𝑙_𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 have a 
negative sign, suggesting that the effort-wage relationship is less steep for wages above the fair level for 
both types of workers. We use an F-test to evaluate whether the asymmetry is the same for immediate 
and delayed workers by testing the restriction that  𝛽𝑖𝑚𝑚_𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 −   𝛽𝑖𝑚𝑚_𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 =   𝛽𝑑𝑒𝑙_𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 −
   𝛽𝑑𝑒𝑙_𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤. The F-test is not significant (p-value is 0.695 without demographics, and 0.773 with 
demographics). We present a more complete picture of the incidence of negative reciprocity in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 – Marginal Effects of Increasing Wage on Effort Provision, Evaluated at Different Levels of the Gap 
between the Wage and the Fair Wage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Fair Wage Gap 
(Fair Wage – Wage) 
-3 USD -2 USD -1 USD 0 USD 1 USD 2 USD 
Immediate  
Workers 
0.978 
(0.162) 
1.056 
(0.015) 
1.134 
(<0.001) 
1.212 
(<0.001) 
0.659 
(0.063) 
0.106 
(0.852) 
       
Delayed  
Workers 
0.677 
(0.613) 
0.707 
(0.337) 
0.737 
(0.014) 
0.767 
(0.245) 
-0.108 
(0.921) 
-0.983 
(0.598) 
       
Values are constructed by adding a multiple of the coefficient for wage above or below the fair wage to the wage 
coefficient in the last column of Table 5, which includes demographics. Not including demographics yield similar 
results. The p-values of F-tests are in parentheses. For the column of 0 USD, the p-values are from t-tests. 
The table shows the estimated marginal effect of a wage increase on effort, evaluated at different wage 
levels relative to the fair wage, for both types of worker. Negative reciprocity exists over a large range of 
wages for immediate workers, as the marginal effect is significant at -2, -1, and 0 USD. However, it is 
weaker and has a different pattern for delayed workers. Though the marginal effect is positive at all 
wage levels below the fair wage, it is only significant at -1 USD. This pattern is consistent with a 
threshold pattern of effort for delayed workers, in which effort is greater when the wage is at or above, 
than when it is below, the fair level. Within each of these two wage ranges, higher wages are not 
associated with significantly greater effort. The patterns are described in results 3 and 4.16 
                                                          
16
 We can also conduct a separate regression for each type of worker, with variables for the gap below and above 
the fair wages in addition to the wage variable. This increases the pseudo-R
2
 for immediate workers compared to 
using only one wage variable (pseudo-R
2 
is 0.117 without demographics and 0.206 with demographics, compared 
to 0.096 without demographics and 0.182 with demographics). For delayed workers, however, the pseudo-R
2
 stays 
essentially the same (0.026 in both cases without demographics, and 0.041 compared to 0.045 with 
demographics). 
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Result 3: The effort of immediate workers decreases the farther wages are below self-reported fair 
wages. There is no relationship between effort and wages, when wages are above fair levels. 
Result 4: For delayed workers, effort is lower when wages are below self-reported fair wages than when 
they are above. The relationship is consistent with a threshold structure. 
4.3 Exploratory Analysis 
In addition to evaluating our prior hypotheses, we consider three issues. The first is whether there is a 
relationship between emotions and effort provision, and whether this differs between the two types of 
worker. Specifically, overall emotional valence and anger are our prime concerns, because they have 
been associated with reciprocity in other contexts. The second issue is whether employers correctly 
anticipate the reciprocal wage-effort relationship, and the third is whether employers’ non-binding 
effort request has an effect on effort provision. 
Table 7 – Changes in Emotions of Workers when Learning their Wage 
 Immediate Workers Delayed Workers 
 Prior Change Prior Change 
 Average Average 1
st
 Quart. 3
rd
 Quart. Average Average 1
st
 Quart. 3
rd
 Quart. 
         
Valence -0.245 
(0.221) 
-0.011 
(0.286)  
-0.162 0.156 -0.182 
(0.241) 
-0.054 
(0.217) 
-0.176  0.078  
Neutrality 0.356     
(0.209) 
-0.003  
(0.242)  
-0.075 0.121    0.375 
(0.169) 
0.029 
(0.172) 
-0.070 0.173   
Happiness 0.028 
(0.041) 
0.000 
(0.046) 
-0.008 0.013  0.035 
(0.062) 
-0.017 
(0.063) 
-0.024 0.005  
Surprise 0.158 
(0.209) 
-0.050  
(0.169)  
-0.065 0.070 0.126 
(0.144) 
-0.012 
(0.230) 
-0.081  0.027 
Sadness 0.096 
(0.185) 
0.000    
(0.225)  
-0.025  0.002  0.095 
(0.171) 
 -0.011 
(0.102) 
-0.094 0.043  
Anger 0.120 
(0.152) 
0.055    
(0.230) 
-0.056 0.150  0.090 
(0.144) 
0.042 
(0.110) 
-0.025 0.109  
Fear 0.0148 
(0.027) 
-0.003    
(0.038)  
-0.012 0.000 0.005 
(0.012) 
0.017 
(0.073) 
-0.001  0.007 
Disgust 0.123 
(0.188) 
-0.048   
(0.176) 
-0.088 0.016  0.085 
(0.157) 
0.010 
(0.183)  
-0.051 0.029    
         
N 29    28    
         
Each emotion has a separate intensity score from 0 to 1. To calculate a change, we use the difference between the average in 
the 45 seconds after learning the wage and the average in the prior 45 seconds. Participants were included only if the software 
could capture their emotions at least 40% of the time both prior and after. The emotional valence is calculated by taking the 
score of happiness and subtracting the score of the strongest negative emotion, i.e. the maximum score of anger, disgust, fear, 
and sadness. 
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The summary statistics regarding the change in emotions of workers when they learn their wage in 
Tucson-H are presented in Table 7, separated by types of worker. For each emotion, we show the 
average intensity prior to learning the wage and the change in intensity when learning the wage. We 
also show the change in intensity corresponding to the 1st quartile and the 3rd quartile change. 51% of 
the participants are left out because the videos do not conform to what the FaceReader software 
requires (the face in full view) or because of recording problems.17 This leaves 57 observations. The table 
reveals some interesting patterns. The first is that among both immediate and delayed workers, at least 
25% experience an increase, and at least 25% undergo a decrease, in the strength of each emotion. The 
second is that anger is the emotion with the largest average increase for both types of workers. The 
third is that the 3rd quartile change in the intensity of anger is larger for immediate than delayed 
workers, suggesting that more immediate workers experience a greater level of anger. 
For immediate workers, the correlation between anger and effort is negative and almost significant (the 
correlation is -0.315, the Spearman 1-sided p-value is 0.055, N=29), and the correlation between wage 
and anger is negative and significant (correlation is -0.375, Spearman 1-sided p-value is 0.040, N=29). 
For delayed workers, the correlation between anger and effort is close to zero and not significant 
(correlation is 0.019, Spearman 1-sided p-value is 0.267, N=28), and the correlation between wage and 
anger is negative but not significant (correlation is -0.072, Spearman 1-sided p-value is 0.112, N=28). A 
non-parametric test reveals that immediate workers become significantly angrier the lower the wage 
they receive, and for them, greater anger is associated with lower subsequent effort (although only at 
slightly above significance levels). For delayed workers, low wages do not generate anger and anger is 
not associated with subsequent effort. 
We can also restrict our correlation analysis to participants who receive a wage equal to or below their 
reported fair wage. For immediate workers, the negative correlation between anger and effort is 
stronger and significant (correlation is -0.504, Spearman 1-sided p-value is 0.009, N=19), and the same is 
true for the negative correlation between wage and anger (correlation is -0.591, Spearman 1-sided p-
value is <0.001, N=19). For delayed workers, the correlation between anger and effort is negative, but 
still only close to significant (correlation is -0.307, Spearman 1-sided p-value is 0.061, N=24), and the 
                                                          
17
 Many participants started the experiment seated such that the camera could record their whole face, but then 
leaned down or slouched until a part of their face was out of view. A few were covering their face with their hands 
at the crucial moment when they received their wage. A few cameras also stopped recording because of 
malfunctions. 
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negative correlation between anger and effort is significant (correlation is -0.355, Spearman 1-sided p-
value is 0.008, N=24). Therefore, the relationships between wages and anger and between anger and 
subsequent effort become stronger for both types of workers if we consider only workers not overpaid 
compared to their fair wage. Both relationships, however, are more substantial for immediate 
workers.18 
To test parametrically whether changes in emotions predict effort, while accounting for the censoring of 
effort at 0, we estimate the following Tobit regression: 
𝐞𝐣 = 𝛂 + 𝛑 ∗ 𝐌𝐣 + 𝛆𝐣                                 (IV) 
Where Mj includes either changes in emotional valence or in individual emotions. The regression is 
estimated for immediate and delayed workers’ effort separately, and the estimates are given in Table 8. 
We include the demographic controls in the estimation. Columns 1 – 6 report estimates for immediate 
workers, while 7 – 9 contain those for delayed workers. Removing the demographic controls from the 
regression does not affect the significance of our estimates or the size of the anger coefficient. 
  
                                                          
18
 There are few immediate and delayed workers who receive more than the wage that they consider fair, making 
it difficult to draw conclusions about the correlations between anger and effort chosen, and between anger and 
wage received, for workers receiving more than a fair wage. Nevertheless, there is no clear pattern in the 
correlations, as two are positive, one negative, and one near zero. None is close to significant. 
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Table 8 – Estimates from Tobit Regression (IV) of Effort on Emotions 
Each emotion has a separate intensity score from 0 to 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. P-values: *0.10, **0.05, ***0.01, 
****0.001. 
 
Column 2 presents the estimate of anger when it is the only emotion in the regression. The coefficient of 
anger is negative and significant (p-value is 0.002). The coefficient is approximately -3.5. A change 
corresponding to the 3rd quartile of change in anger (0.15) therefore results in a 0.5 reduction in effort. 
This is large relative to the average effort of 1.4 (s.e. 1.2) for immediate workers. By comparing columns 
2 and 3, we see that anger explains less variation than the wage itself (Pseudo-R2 is 0.1635 when 
including anger and excluding wage and 0.2147 when excluding anger and including wage). Column 6 
presents the estimates of each individual emotion when they are all included in the regression. The 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Immediate Workers     Delayed Workers  
Valence 0.932 
(1.378) 
     1.139 
(2.477) 
  
Anger  -3.614
*** 
(1.062) 
 -2.089
*
 
(1.061) 
-7.301 
(5.028) 
-2.964
**
 
(1.382) 
 2.343 
(4.754) 
1.165 
(6.741) 
Sadness      1.767 
(1.731) 
  -4.296 
(4.893) 
Disgust      0.847 
(2.017) 
  0.468 
(3.763) 
Fear      7.747 
(5.952) 
  -9.589 
(7.529) 
Surprise      1.472 
(1.759) 
  -2.690 
(3.629) 
Happiness      -1.130 
(6.323) 
  1.221 
(9.997) 
Wage   1.040
****
(0.271)  
0.832
*** 
(0.292) 
0.696
*
 
(0.343) 
    
Int. Wage 
and Anger 
    2.112 
(1.886) 
    
Age -0.108 
(0.192) 
-0.039 
(0.149) 
-0.210   
(0.179) 
-0.164 
(0.160) 
-0.160 
(0.172) 
0.074 
(0.166) 
-0.103 
(0.133) 
-0.134 
(0.126) 
-0.185 
(0.178) 
Man 1.279
** 
(0.570) 
1.561
**
 
(0.581) 
0.835
*
 
(0.433) 
1.135
**
 
(0.485) 
1.055
**
 
(0.504) 
1.486
**
 
(0.612) 
0.842 
(1.104) 
0.918 
(1.106) 
0.985 
(1.443) 
Friend 1.138 
(1.125) 
1.244 
(0.917) 
1.746
***
 
(0.596) 
1.572
**
 
(0.665) 
1.502
**
 
(0.717) 
1.975 
(1.230) 
-0.823 
(0.536) 
-1.018 
(0.624) 
-0.536 
(0.910) 
American 0.237 
(0.695) 
0.598 
(0.620) 
0.240 
(0.683) 
0.441 
(0.647) 
0.516 
(0.633) 
0.571 
(0.596) 
-0.944 
(0.714) 
-1.107 
(0.779) 
-1.367 
(0.870) 
Constant 2.741 
(3.904) 
1.133 
(3.004) 
2.145 
(3.777) 
1.618 
(3.364) 
1.954 
(3.460) 
-1.063 
(3.274) 
4.607 
(2.691) 
5.232
*
 
(2.536) 
6.551
*
 
(3.301) 
          
Pseudo-R
2
 0.080 0.164 0.215 0.251 0.261 0.197 0.030 0.031 0.081 
N 29      28   
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coefficient of anger is still negative and significant (p-value is 0.040), whereas none of the other 
individual emotions or overall valence has a significant coefficient.  
Including wage and anger in the same regression yields a significant wage coefficient, and renders anger 
borderline insignificant (column 4; p-value is 0.061). This suggests that low wages have a direct effect on 
effort, and some of the relationship between anger and effort in other specifications is a consequence of 
the effect of wages on the anger level. We include the term for the interaction of wage and anger in 
column 5. The wage is marginally insignificant (p-value of 0.055), and the anger and the interaction 
terms are not significant. The interaction is difficult to interpret since, as we discuss later, the wage 
influences anger. Nevertheless, participants who become angrier when learning that they receive a low 
wage increase effort more in reaction to a wage increase (F-tests do not reject the restriction 1*[wage]-
0.05*[interaction anger], which corresponds to 1st quartile change in anger, with p-value of 0.155, and 
reject the restriction 1*[wage] + 0.15*[interaction anger], which corresponds to the 3rd quartile change 
in anger, with p-value of 0.004). 
As an additional examination not shown in Table 8, we regress each individual emotion separately on 
immediate effort. Only sadness has a significant coefficient (coefficient is -3.3 (s.e. 1.2), p-value is 0.009). 
The coefficient of sadness is similar in magnitude to one for anger, but is positive in sign. This means 
that an increase in sadness is predictive of an increase in effort. This might be due to the correlation 
between anger and sadness (correlation is -0.35). A regression including both anger and sadness yields a 
significant coefficient for anger only. A regression that includes anger, sadness, and the wage results in 
an insignificant anger coefficient and a significant sadness coefficient, but only when demographics are 
included in our specification.19 
The above relationships do not appear for delayed workers.  Neither emotional valence nor any of the 
individual emotions have a significant coefficient in columns 7-9.20 21 
                                                          
19
 While a positive relationship between sadness and effort might be surprising at first glance, it is consistent with a 
common theme in psychology. A large body of work emphasizes the role of empathy in generating altruistic 
behavior (see Batson 2011 for a recent overview). It could be, then, that workers who are able to feel how the 
employer would feel if effort were low, are the ones giving more. Sadness may reflect the expression of this 
empathy. 
20
 Again, excluding demographics does not make a difference. 
21
 In Appendix A, we report regression estimates with the restricted set of workers paid less than or equal to their 
reported fair wage. The coefficient of anger is still generally significant or marginally insignificant only for 
immediate workers. 
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Table 9 - Determinants of Emotional Changes in Workers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Emotion Anger Sadness Disgust Fear Surprise Happiness Valence 
       
Immediate workers      
Wage 
-0.111
***
 
(0.036) 
0.009  
(0.034) 
-0.048  
(0.031) 
0.004  
(0.008) 
0.037 
(0.046) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
0.121
**
 
(0.055) 
Constant 
-0.352 
(0.450) 
0.794 
(0.511) 
-0.248 
(0.542) 
0.042 
(0.101) 
0.385 
(0.462) 
-0.062 
(0.139) 
-0.294 
(0.538) 
Adj. R
2
 0.159 0.171 0.037 -0.065 -0.076 -0.049 0.269 
N 29       
        
Delayed workers      
Wage 
-0.007   
(0.020) 
-0.011 
 (0.021) 
-0.067
*  
(0.035) 
-0.010  
(0.008) 
-0.028  
(0.039) 
0.015
*  
(0.007) 
0.094
**  
(0.037) 
Constant 
-0.041 
(0.114) 
0.011 
(0.092) 
-0.197 
(0.373) 
0.076 
(0.060) 
0.527
**
 
(0.240) 
0.032 
(0.044) 
0.141 
(0.329) 
Adj. R
2
 -0.129 -0.030 0.095 -0.132 -0.012 0.058 0.161 
N 28       
        
Each emotion has a separate intensity score from 0 to 1. Demographic controls are included. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. P-values: *0.10, **0.05, ***0.01, ****0.001. 
 
We also study the effect of wage on emotions. To do this, we regress each emotion on wage individually 
using OLS. The estimates are shown in Table 9. The wage has a significant negative effect on the anger 
level of immediate workers (p-value is 0.005) and no significant effect for delayed workers.22 
Furthermore, we find that the emotional valence of both types of workers is significantly increased by a 
higher wage.23 The findings are summarized as our fifth result. 
Result 5: For immediate workers, (1) anger is negatively associated with subsequent effort, and (2) lower 
wages lead to greater anger. These relationships are stronger for those paid less than or equal to the 
wage they view as fair. For delayed workers, anger is negatively associated with subsequent effort, and 
lower wages lead to greater anger, only for those paid less than or equal to their fair wage. Both 
relationships are weaker for delayed workers than for immediate workers. 
                                                          
22
 Excluding demographics yields a similar coefficient of anger for immediate workers of -0.091 (s.e. 0.032; p-value 
< 0.001), and does not change the lack of significance of anger for delayed workers. 
23
 The regression estimates from the subset of workers paid less than or equal to their reported fair wage are given 
in Appendix A. The coefficient of the wage is significant for immediate workers and marginally significant for 
delayed workers, but the coefficient of immediate workers is five times larger. 
  
 
27 
 
 
Additionally, the emotions of employers when they choose their wage are unrelated to their choice of 
wage. We find no significant correlation between individual emotions and the choice of wage, using 
Spearman tests. 
To explore whether employers anticipate the wage-effort relationship for each type of worker correctly, 
we regress the effort prediction of employers on the wage that the employer offered. We use a Tobit 
regression. The estimates are shown in Table 12. 
Table 10 – Regression of Employers’ Effort Prediction on the Wage Offered 
 Tilburg-H  Tucson-H  
Effort Predicted Immediate Delayed Immediate Delayed 
Wage 0.883
****
 
(0.919) 
0.718
****
 
(0.121) 
0.432
*** 
(0.128) 
0.221 
(0.188) 
Age 0.013 
(0.036) 
-0.013 
(0.038) 
0.042  
(0.029) 
0.076
*
 
(0.040) 
Man -0.344 
(0.248) 
-0.266 
(0.245) 
-0.177 
(0.237) 
-0.320 
(0.335) 
Friend 0.257 
(0.208) 
-0.059 
(0.248) 
0.466
*
 
(0.257) 
0.561 
(0.574) 
American 
 
  0.442  
(0.275) 
0.472 
(0.337) 
European 
 
0.561
*** 
(0.195) 
0.497
**
 
(0.222) 
  
Constant -0.446 
(0.861) 
0.454 
(0.914) 
-0.120 
(0.610) 
-0.386 
(0.910) 
     
Pseudo-R
2
 0.498 0.323 0.129 0.092 
N 33 33 65 65 
     
Standard errors are in parentheses. P-values: *0.10, **0.05, ***0.01, ****0.001. 
In Tucson-H (columns 1-2), employers offering a higher wage predict higher effort by immediate 
workers, but not by delayed ones. In Tilburg-H (columns 3-4), employers offering a higher wage predict a 
higher effort for both groups of worker. This result does not establish a causal link between wages and 
effort, since it is consistent with the existence of reciprocal behavior on the part of the employer, or 
with the anticipation on the part of the employer of reciprocal behavior by the employee. The significant 
coefficient on the variable European suggests that there may be cultural differences in employer 
expectations. 
Our sixth result, which summarizes our findings regarding employer predictions, is the following: 
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Result 6: Employers’ effort predictions are consistent with anticipating the existence of a positive wage-
effort relationship for immediate workers. For delayed workers, this relationship is weaker and 
inconsistent. 
Lastly, we test whether asking for a higher effort has an effect on worker’s effort. We use regression (I), 
in which we add the effort the employer requested as an independent variable. We allow for a 
differential effect on the two types of workers. There is no significant effect on either immediate or 
delayed workers 
5. Conclusion 
Akerlof and Yellen (1988, 1990) propose the Fair Wage-Effort hypothesis, a notion that workers shirk in 
retaliation for wages below the level that they perceive as fair. They propose that the process whereby 
this occurs is that low wages generate anger and in turn, anger leads to low effort. Furthermore, they 
assume that there is no reciprocity for wages above the fair level. The existence of this asymmetry has 
been supported by the field experiment reported by Cohn et al. (2014). They found that the reciprocal 
relationship between wages and effort held only for wage below what workers considered fair, and that 
the relationship was stable over time during a temporary employment relationship. Here, we consider 
whether the same relationship is observed in a simpler one-shot, but delayed, interaction, which allows 
us to clearly isolate any reciprocal behavior from other decisions. We also consider the relationship 
between wages, anger, and effort. 
Some features of our experiment allow us to evaluate other patterns in the Akerlof and Yellen model. 
The model postulates an emotional mechanism as the source of the reciprocal wage-effort relationship. 
Emotions may be short-lived, and we consider whether the asymmetric relationship in their model 
persists over time. Comparing worker decisions on the same day and one month after learning their 
wage allows us to test whether workers’ reciprocation of employer wage decisions would decrease with 
a long delay between the time workers learn their wage and the time they choose their effort. Eliciting 
self-reported fair wages aimed to test whether reciprocity is stronger for wages below vs. above fair 
levels, and whether any observed asymmetry is stable over time. We also consider whether a delay 
affects employers’ expectations and workers’ emotional reactions. 
We observe that, as predicted by Akerlof and Yellen, lower wages are reciprocated with lower effort, but 
only when they are less than or equal to a level the worker considers fair. This reciprocal relationship is 
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very pronounced for those making their decisions on the same day as they learn their wage, and weaker 
and less consistent for those choosing effort one month later. The asymmetry around the fair wage is 
present under both time horizons. In the short term, workers decrease their effort the farther their 
wage is below the fair wage. In the long term, workers condition their effort on whether the fair wage 
threshold has been met or not. While the link between wages and effort is sharper in the short-run, 
overall effort is similar over the two time horizons. Our results are in line with Cohn et al. (2014)’s 
finding that reciprocity is restricted to workers who feel paid less than a fair wage. 
We also obtain some additional results. First, employers’ predictions of workers’ effort are consistent 
with a reciprocal wage-effort relationship in the short-term, but the relationship is less consistent in the 
long-term. Thus, employers seem to demonstrate an awareness that the reciprocal relationship 
between wage and effort exists in the short term, and tends to dissipate in the long term.  
Second, anger on the part of immediate workers is associated with low effort, especially for those paid 
less than or equal to their fair wage. However, for delayed workers, this relationship appears only 
weakly, and only for workers who are paid less than or equal to fair wages. Low wages provoke anger in 
immediate workers, but less anger in their delayed colleagues. Workers who receive less than or equal 
to their fair wage exhibit a steeper relationship between anger and wages. This pattern is consistent 
with the asymmetry assumed in the Fair Wage-Effort hypothesis.  
It is well-known from previous studies that experienced anger can affect decisions taken immediately. 
Recall that we measure anger here at the time a worker learns of her offer, rather than at the time she 
chooses her effort. However, it is interesting that anger is stronger when one must react to a decision in 
the near rather than the more distant future. It is noteworthy that the change in anger when learning 
one’s wage is a good indicator of subsequent effort, although not as good an indicator as the wage itself. 
We also provide some evidence that wages might interact with anger. A lower wage results in less effort 
for those immediate workers who become angrier at the time of learning their wage. 
Anger is the only emotion, of those we are able to measure, that is correlated to both wages received 
and effort chosen. Sadness is unrelated to wage, though positively correlated with effort. This may be 
evidence of sadness reflecting empathy, and feelings of empathy leading to higher effort with the 
purpose of benefiting the other player. The effect only appears once demographics are controlled for, 
suggesting that the effect of sadness on behavior is stronger for some demographic groups than others.  
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Overall emotional valence, though negatively affected by low wages, is not associated with effort on the 
part of either immediate or delayed workers. 
As discussed in the introduction, the previous literature has yielded mixed results with regard to 
whether the reciprocal relationship between wage and effort is durable. Our reading of the literature 
(Gneezy and List, 2006; Bellemare and Shearer, 2009; Hossain and List 2012; Kube et al., 2012, 2013; 
Cohn et al., 2014; Gilchrist et al., 2016) is that the persistence of the relationship depends on context, 
prior and future interaction between workers and employers, and culture. It not implausible that some 
cultures have a stronger norm of rewarding good deeds and punishing bad ones.24 In our almost 
completely decontextualized laboratory setting, we observe that the wage-effort relationship weakens 
over time in one subject population more than another. Nonetheless, average effort within each 
population is the same when effort decisions are taken on the same day or delayed by a month. 
It may be that workers are more forgiving of low wages after a long cooling off period, and this might 
have to do with the dissipation of the anger associated with a receiving a low wage. More generally, a 
reinforcement of negative reciprocity through a channel of anger would be consistent with other 
findings that negative reciprocity is stronger than positive reciprocity (e.g. Offerman, 2002; Charness, 
2004; Engelmann and Ortmann, 2009; Kube et al., 2013; Cohn et al., 2014). Alternatively, it may be that 
workers learning now that they will receive a low wage in the future discount the value of this future 
wage, adapt to it over time, and therefore do not punish the employer once they finally receive it. This 
can explain why we observe less anger at the low wages for employees who know they will receive their 
wage only one month later. This is consistent with reference-point models where one adapts to a lower 
reference wage (e.g. Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006). 
Although it has been traditional to view emotions as outside the purview of economics, there is 
increasing recognition that they are important for decision making. Anger, for example, is the 
psychological mechanism proposed in Akerlof and Yellen (1990) to explain why workers would work less 
if they received less than what they believed is their fair wage, and has been modelled in psychological 
game theory (Battigalli, Dufwenberg, and Smith, 2015). While including emotions in empirical work is a 
                                                          
24
 For cross-cultural reviews, see Oosterbeek, Sloof, and van De Kuilen (2004) on Ultimatum Games; Cardenas and 
Carpenter (2008) on Trust and Ultimatum Games; and Henrich, McElreath, Barr, Ensminger, Barrett, Bolyanatz, 
Cardenas, Gurven, Gwako, Henrich, Lesorogol, Marlowe, Tracer, and Ziker (2006), Gächter and Herrmann (2009) 
and Henrich et al. (2010) for willingness to punish. 
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new and challenging avenue for economics, we believe that it might yield valuable insights into the 
mechanism whereby other-regarding preferences influence behaviour. Here we show that anger and 
not happiness is the emotion associated with effort, reaffirming the view that variations in effort reflect 
gradations in negative reciprocity. We believe that the direct measurement and tracking of emotions is 
useful in distinguishing between different models, such as the Partial Gift Exchange version of 
reciprocity and its Fair Wage-Effort extension. 
One can ask how profitable it was for employers to offer a higher wage. In Tucson-H, offering a higher 
wage to both immediate and delayed workers was highly profitable. With a wage coefficient of 0.93 and 
0.63 for the immediate and delayed workers, respectively, employers were increasing revenues by 2.33 
USD (2.5*0.93) for a 1 USD increase in wage for immediate workers and by 1.58 USD (2.5*0.63) for 
delayed workers. In Tilburg-H and Tilburg-L, with wage coefficients of 0.75, -0.37, 0.38, and 0.26, for 
short-term and long-term workers in each experiment, respectively, employers increased revenues by 
1.88 EUR, -0.93 EUR, 0.95 EUR, and 0.65 EUR by offering a 1 EUR wage increase. This means that paying 
a higher wage to immediate workers resulted in greater or similar profits for employers, but that paying 
higher wages to delayed workers was profitable in only one of the three experiments. Nonetheless, in all 
cases, once wages exceed the level a worker views as fair, employers lose profits by paying more. As 
such, the examination of the timing of the task at hand and employee views about fair wages can 
benefit employers trying to induce high effort from their employees. 
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Appendix A – Additional Analyses of the Relationships between Anger, Wage, 
and Effort 
 
In Table 11, we present the estimates from the Tobit regression (IV) of effort on emotions, but using 
only the subset of workers paid less than or equal to the wage they view as fair. Columns 1 to 4 reports 
the estimates for immediate workers and columns 5-8 for delayed workers. For immediate workers, 
anger generally has a significant or close to significant negative coefficient. For delayed workers, anger 
only has a significant negative coefficient when including other emotions and demographic controls. 
 
Table 11 - Estimates of Effect on Effort from Tobit Regression (IV), for Workers Paid Less than or Equal to 
Reported Fair Wage 
Standard errors are in parentheses. P-values: *0.10, **0.05, ***0.01, ****0.001. 
 
In Table 12, we show the results of the OLS regression of worker anger on the wage, for the subset of 
workers paid less than or equal to the wage they view as fair. Column 1 reports the estimate for 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Immediate workers   Delayed workers   
Anger -3.079
*
 
(1.439) 
-2.322 
(1.290) 
-3.017
**
 
(1.051) 
-2.972
**
 
(1.030) 
-8.676 
(5.321) 
-11.463
**
 
(5.136) 
-6.674 
(4.654) 
-5.573 
(5.122) 
         
Sadness -0.375 
(1.139) 
1.642 
(1.600) 
 
 
 
 
-1.858 
(4.149) 
-1.469 
(5.017) 
 
 
 
 
         
Disgust -0.444 
(2.206) 
-0.689 
(2.139) 
 
 
 
 
3.144 
(2.732) 
4.177 
(2.731) 
 
 
 
 
         
Fear -7.814 
(10.900) 
-14.162 
(9.809) 
 
 
 
 
-30.387 
(22.060) 
-54.493 
(36.854) 
 
 
 
 
         
Surprised 0.319 
(1.698) 
0.762 
(1.585) 
 
 
 
 
2.129 
(3.670) 
1.507 
(4.368) 
 
 
 
 
         
Happiness -4.924 
(6.871) 
-0.728 
(5.755) 
 
 
 
 
-7.088 
(8.278) 
-11.920 
(8.477) 
 
 
 
 
         
Constant 1.047
***
 
(0.307) 
-1.394 
(5.551) 
1.184
****
 
(0.257) 
4.624 
(4.492) 
2.093
****
 
(0.487) 
4.315
*
 
(2.290) 
1.845
****
 
(0.452) 
2.862 
(1.804) 
         
Demographics No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
         
Pseudo-R
2
 0.173 0.272 0.137 0.240 0.110 0.159 0.029 0.054 
N 19    24    
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immediate workers and column 2 for delayed workers. The wage offered has a significant negative 
effect on immediate workers, and a close to significant negative effect on delayed workers (one-sided p-
value is below the 0.05 significance level). However, the coefficient is much bigger for immediate 
workers. Not including demographics yield similar results. 
 
Table 12 - Determinants of Change in Anger, for Workers Paid Less than or Equal to Reported Fair Wage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses. P-values: *0.10, 
**0.05, ***0.01, ****0.001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Immediate 
Workers 
Delayed 
Workers 
Wage -0.227
***
 
(0.061) 
-0.037
*
 
(0.020) 
   
Age 0.038 
(0.030) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
   
Man 0.183 
(0.135) 
-0.034 
(0.041) 
   
Friend -0.142 
(0.174) 
0.067 
(0.060) 
   
American 0.206
**
 
(0.073) 
0.057 
(0.052) 
   
Constant -0.425 
(0.610) 
-0.038 
(0.103) 
   
R
2
 0.540 0.291 
N 19 24 
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Appendix B - Instructions (for Tucson-H) 
We present the instructions for the Tucson-H experiment. The instructions are very similar for the other 
two experiments. 
Introduction 
Welcome. The camera on top of your computer screen is currently turned on and you will be 
filmed for the entire session. The video will be seen only by the experimenters and will be 
destroyed once data have been gathered from it. The content of the video will not affect your 
payment. If you disagree with being filmed, you are free to leave at any time, and you will keep 
the show-up fee, but you will not receive additional payment. 
In this experiment, the instructions are simple and if you read them carefully you can earn a 
considerable amount of money. Everything you earn is on top of a 5 dollar show- up fee and a 3 
dollar participation fee. You are forbidden to communicate with other participants at any time.  
At the end the experiment, the earnings you have made will be paid to you by sending you cash 
or a check in the mail. Take a moment now to write down your name and your mailing address 
on the envelope in front of you. Please be careful, as we will use this envelope to send your 
payment. 
This experiment takes around 40 minutes in the lab. In addition, depending on the role you are 
randomly assigned, you might have to take 5 minutes outside the lab to send an email, either in 
the 3 hours after the session today or in 4 weeks. If anything is unclear during the experiment, 
please raise your hand and the experimenter will come to you. 
Roles 
In this experiment, participants are randomly assigned, with equal chance, to 1 of the 3 roles: 1) 
employer, 2) employee choosing now or 3) employee choosing later. You will be placed in a 
group of 3 made of 1 employer, 1 employee choosing now, and 1 employee choosing later. The 
identity of the members of each group will be kept secret from all participants. Your role will be 
now revealed to you on your screen. Do not reveal your role to others and do not mention your 
role aloud to the experimenter. 
General Instructions 
This is an experiment about employer-employees interaction. First, the employer chooses a 
wage between 0 and 4 dollars for his/her 2 employees and asks them to choose a specific effort 
level between 0 and 4. The wage is the same for each employee. The employer cannot force 
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the employees to choose a specific effort level. Second, the employees learn their wage and 
each employee chooses an effort level between 0 and 4. The employee choosing now will 
choose an effort level within 3 hours after the end of today’s session and the employee 
choosing later will choose an effort level in 4 weeks. A higher effort level costs an employee 
more but benefits the employer more. Each unit of effort chosen costs the employee 25 cents 
and increases the earnings of the employer by 2.50 dollars. Employees receive the wage, no 
matter what effort level they choose. In addition, the employer is asked to make a prediction 
about the effort of each employee. Also, before learning his/her wage, each employee is asked 
to state the wage he/she thinks would be fair to receive. 
Specific Instructions for the Employer 
The employer chooses a wage between 0 and 4 dollars for each of the two employees. The 
wage can be chosen in any increment of 10 cents. The wage is the same for both employees. 
The employer has to pay the wage twice because there are two employees, one choosing an 
effort today and one choosing an effort in 4 weeks. The wages are costly for the employer and 
benefit the employee. The wages are deducted from the employer’s earnings. The wage for one 
employee is added to that employee’s earnings. The employer also asks for a specific effort 
level from each employee. The specific effort asked is the same for each employee. The 
employer cannot force an employee to choose a specific effort. Each employee is free to 
choose an effort level that is the same or different from the level that is asked. Each unit of 
effort chosen by an employee will cost him/her 25 cents and pay the employer 2.50 dollars. 
Your payment calculation is described in the section Payment Calculation for All Roles. 
In addition, the employer is asked to predict the effort level of each employee. This pre- diction 
will not be revealed to any participant. Once both employees have chosen their effort level, the 
prediction for one employee will be randomly chosen. If this prediction is within 0.4 of the 
effort chosen by the employee, the employer will receive an additional 1 dollar. 
The payment to the employer will be sent by mail on the day after the receipt of the effort level 
chosen by the employee choosing in 4 weeks. The employer has no email to send. If an 
employee does not choose an effort level, the employer is paid back the wage that was given to 
the employee. 
Specific Instructions for the Employee Choosing Now 
The employer will offer each employee a wage between 0 and 4 dollars and ask for a specific 
effort level between 0 and 4. The wage chosen is deducted from the employer’s earnings. The 
employer cannot force an employee to choose a specific effort, he/she can only ask for it. The 
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employee will then have to choose an effort between 0 and 4. The effort can be chosen in any 
increment of 0.1. The effort is costly for the employee and benefits the employer. Each unit of 
effort chosen by an employee will cost him/her 25 cents and pay the employer 2.50 dollars. 
Your payment calculation is described in the section Payment Calculation for All Roles. 
The employee choosing now chooses his/her effort level within the 3 hours after the end of 
today’s session. He/she does not choose the effort level during the session. He/she chooses the 
effort level by sending an email to the experimenter. The email address of the experimenter is 
written on the last page of these instructions. You can leave with the last page of the 
instructions after today’s session. Thus you can also write anything you might need on the last 
page. The envelope with your payment will be mailed on the day after the receipt of your 
email. Please respect the 3 hour deadline as it will be enforced. 
If you send your effort choice more than 3 hours after the end of this session, you will only be 
paid your show-up and participation fees. 
In addition, before learning his/her wage, each employee will be asked what is the wage that 
he/she would consider fair to receive. The wage can be anything between 0 and 4 dollars, in 
any increment of 10 cents. This fair wage will not be revealed to any participant in the 
experiment. It cannot influence the wage that an employee receives. Please simply try to be 
truthful even if it does not influence your earnings. 
Specific Instructions for the Employee Choosing Later 
The employer will offer each employee a wage between 0 and 4 dollars and ask for a specific 
effort level between 0 and 4. The wage chosen is deducted from the employer’s earnings. The 
employer cannot force an employee to choose a specific effort, he/she can only ask for it. The 
employee will then have to choose an effort between 0 and 4. The effort can be chosen in any 
increment of 0.1. The effort is costly for the employee and benefits the employer. Each unit of 
effort chosen by an employee will cost him/her 25 cents and pay the employer 2.50 dollars. 
Your payment calculation is described in the section Payment Calculation for All Roles. 
The employee choosing later chooses his/her effort level only in 4 weeks after today’s session. 
He/she does not choose the effort level during the session. He/she chooses the effort level by 
sending an email to the experimenter. The email address of the experimenter is written on the 
last page of these instructions. You can leave with the last page of the instructions after today’s 
session. Thus you can also write anything you might need on the last page. The date in 4 weeks 
is also written on the last page. You will have 5 days to send your effort then, with the starting 
day being the date in 4 weeks. The envelope with your payment will be mailed on the day after 
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the receipt of your email. Please respect the 5 day period beginning in 4 weeks. If you send your 
choice of effort before or after the 5 day period, you will only be paid your show-up and 
participation fees. An email reminder will be sent to you on the starting day in 4 weeks. The 
wage, the effort asked by the employer, and a copy of these instructions will be in the email 
reminder. 
In addition, before learning his/her wage, each employee will be asked what is the wage that 
he/she would consider fair to receive. The wage can be anything between 0 and 4 dollars, in 
any increment of 10 cents. This fair wage will not be revealed to any participant in the 
experiment. It cannot influence the wage that an employee receives. Please simply try to be 
truthful even if it does not influence your earnings. 
Payment Calculation for All Roles 
Earnings in dollars for participants in each of the 3 roles are described by these formulas: 
Employer: 11 − 2 ∗ wage + 2.5 ∗ (effort of employee choosing now + effort of employee choosing 
later) 
Employee choosing now: 4 + wage − 0.25∗ effort of employee choosing now  
Employee choosing later: 4 + wage − 0.25∗ effort of employee choosing later 
Note that the 5 dollar show-up fee, the 3 dollar participation fee, and the potential payment for 
the employer’s predictions are not included. Please take a minute to study these formulas 
carefully as your earnings depend on understanding them. 
Practice 
During the experiment, you can choose only once. Before you start, please practice with 2 
examples on the last page. The examples will not affect your earnings. When you have 
completed them, please raise your hand and the experimenter will verify your answers. This is 
the best time to ask questions to the experimenter to be sure that you under- stand. Please do 
not hesitate to ask. Your earnings depend on your understanding of the instructions. 
At the end of the session, when you are done with the questionnaire, please stay seated and 
raise your hand. The experimenter will come to you and ask you to sign a sheet before you can 
leave. Please do not communicate with others during that time and leave your envelope at your 
seat.  You are free to leave with the last page of the instructions, on which the email address is 
written. 
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You can leave with this page after today’s session. Feel free to write anything on it. 
 
Example 1: The employer chooses a wage of U, one employee chooses effort T, and the other 
employee chooses effort L. Do not replace the variables with numbers. Please write down the 
earnings for each role: 
Employer: 
Employee choosing effort T:  
Employee choosing effort L: 
 
Example 2: The employer chooses a wage of Z, one employee chooses effort Q, and the other 
employee chooses effort S. Do not replace the variables with numbers. Please write down the 
earnings for each role: 
Employer: 
Employee choosing effort Q: 
Employee choosing effort S: 
 
 
 
 
 
Date today:  xx\xx\2016  
Date in 4 weeks: yy\yy\2016 
Wage can be anything between 0 and 4, in any increment of 0.1.  
Effort level can be anything between 0 and 4, in any increment of 0.1.  
Email to send choice of effort: nickolasgagnon@email.arizona.edu 
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Appendix C – Email Reminders for Delayed Workers 
The email reminders for delayed workers are similar across the three experiments. There are three 
differences. First, participants are reminded of the non-binding effort request of the employer in 
Tucson-H and Tilburg-H, but not in Tilburg-L, as employers do not request an effort level in Tilburg-L. 
Second, participants in Tilburg-L were initially instructed to answer within a time interval of 24 hours, 
but this time interval was subsequently extended. Third, the third paragraph of the reminder for Tucson-
H is not included in the other two experiments. This paragraph shows the range of the wage. The wage 
range, however, is always available in the attached instructions for each experiment. 
Reminder for Tucson-H (original instructions attached) 
Dear participant, 
4 weeks ago, you were assigned to the role of Employee Choosing Later in an experiment at 
the Economic Science Lab of the University of Arizona. You had to send an email to this address 
with your choice of effort level 4 weeks after the session.  
This is the reminder that the date 4 weeks after is today, [date]. You have now 5 days to send 
your choice of effort. These 5 days include today. 
During the session, you were placed in a group of 3 participants consisting of an employer, an 
employee choosing now, and an employee choosing later. The employer had to choose a wage 
between 0 and 4 dollars, in any increment of 10 cents, for each employee. The wage was the 
same for both employees. The wages are deducted from the employer's earnings. 
The employer offered you a wage of $[wage] during the session and asked for an effort level of 
[effort]. You now have to choose your effort level. Note that the employer cannot force you to 
choose a specific effort level. 
You can choose an effort level between 0 and 4, in any increment of 0.1. Each unit of effort that 
you choose will cost you 25 cents, and pay the employer 2.50 dollars. 
Payment Calculation (in dollars): 
Employer: 11−2*Wage +2.5*(Effort of Employee Choosing Now + Effort of Employee Choosing 
Later) 
Employee Choosing Now: 4 + Wage − 0.25*Effort of Employee Choosing Now 
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Employee Choosing Later: 4 + Wage − 0.25*Effort of Employee Choosing Later 
If anything is unclear, please contact me. I also attach a copy of the instructions for the 
experiment. The envelope with your payment will be sent by mail on the day after the receipt 
of your email. 
You must respect the deadline to be paid. 
Reminder for Tilburg-H (original instructions attached) 
Dear participant, 
One month ago, you were attributed the role of Employee Choosing Later in an experiment. 
This means you had to send me an email with your choice of effort 4 weeks after the 
experiment. 
This is a reminder that the date 4 weeks after is today, [date]. You have now 5 days to send me 
your choice of effort. 
An Employer offered you a wage of [wage] euro during the experiment and asked you to make 
an effort of [effort]. You now have to choose your effort (note that the employer cannot force 
you to choose an effort).  
Each effort unit that you choose will cost you 1/4 euro, and will increase the earnings of the 
Employer by 2.5 euro. You can choose an effort between 0 and 2.4, with a precision of 0.1 units. 
Example of Payment Calculation:  
To calculate the payment, consider that W is the wage chosen by the employer, A is the effort 
chosen by one of the employee, and B is the effort chosen by the other employee. In addition, 
there is a fixed fee of 4 euro for the employer and of 5 euro for each employee. The earnings 
are then described by these formulas (note that the fixed fees are included): 
Employer: 4 − 2*W + 2.5*(A+B) + 4 
Employee choosing effort A: W − A/4 + 5  
Employee choosing effort B: W − B/4 + 5 
If anything is unclear, please do not hesitate to email me.  
I also attach a copy of the instructions for the whole experiment to this email, 
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Please respect the deadline to be paid. 
Reminder for Tilburg-L (original instructions attached) 
Dear participant, 
one month ago, you were attributed the role of Employee Choosing Effort Later in an 
experiment. This means you had to send me an email with your choice of effort 30 days after 
the experiment. 
This is a reminder that the date 30 days after is tomorrow, [date]. During the 24h of that day, 
you can send me your choice of effort. If you send your choice before or later the 24h of that 
day, you will not be paid. 
An employer offered you a wage of [wage] euro during the experiment and you are asked to 
choose an effort level. 
Each effort unit that you choose will cost you 1 euro, and will increase the payoff of the 
Employer by 2.5 euro. You can choose an effort level with a precision of 0.1 units. You cannot 
choose an effort level higher than the wage you are paid. 
Example of payment calculation:  
The employer has a wealth of 8 euro. He\She decides a wage that is paid to each of the two 
employees. Each participant receives a participation fee of 4 euro. 
The wage chosen is W, one employee chooses effort level of E1 and the other employee 
chooses effort level of E2. Note that E1 and E2 are variables and not numbers for this example. 
Payment of Employer: 8 - 2*W + 2.5*(E1) +2.5*(E2) + 4  euro 
Payment of 1st Employee: W - (E1) + 4  euro 
Payment of 2nd Employee: W - (E2) + 4  euro 
If anything is unclear, please do not hesitate to email me. 
I also attach a copy of the instructions for the whole experiment to this email, 
Please respect the deadline to be paid. 
